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Habit Forming: Evidence of Physician Habit in Medical 
Negligence Litigation 
Marc D. Ginsberg* 
Abstract: 
”Habit” is a time-honored component of the law of evidence. 
Habit evidence is generally understood as specific conduct which 
occurs repetitively, over a period of time, in response to a known 
stimulus. Habitual conduct is also thought to be non-volitional, 
suggesting that it encompasses conduct without thought. 
This paper focuses on whether the practice of medicine is, in any 
respect, “habitual.” Are medical negligence litigants, plaintiffs 
and physicians, entitled to introduce evidence of physician habit 
to demonstrate deviation from or compliance with the applicable 
standard of care? Is the practice of medicine entirely volitional 
and judgmental, such that classic habit evidence is inapplicable 
to medical negligence litigation? This Article addresses these 
topics in an effort to identify the various positions adopted by 
courts in the United States and recommends that courts receive 
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A habit, from the standpoint of psychology, is a more or less 
fixed way of thinking, willing, or feeling acquired through 
previous repetition of a mental experience.1 
●   ●   ●   ●   ● 
The physician acquires a volitional habit of taking the pulse and 
asking patients certain questions. The habit is the familiar way in 
which his consciousness runs its course during a diagnosis.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Habit is a venerable topic of the law of evidence, pre-dating its appearance 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence by many years.3 Of course, habit is currently 
memorialized by Federal Rule of Evidence 406, which provides: 
Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice 
Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice 
may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person 
or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine 
practice. The court may admit this evidence regardless of 
whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.4 
Rule 406 is an important rule of relevance5 and admissibility,6 yet it neither 
defines “habit” nor specifies who or what may be the source of habit evidence. 
By not defining “habit,” Rule 406 does not address the nature of habit 
evidence. On this point, commentators urge that habit “represents semi-automatic 
or unreflective behavior,”7 also referred to as “nonvolitional activity that occurs 
with invariable regularity.”8 One commentator has emphasized that “[i]t is 
 
 1. B.R. Andrews, Habit, 14 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 121, 121 (1903). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 53, § 14j. (1899); 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW, § 270, Rule 40 (1935). 
 4. FED. R. EVID. 406. 
 5. See id. at 401 (providing the basic definition of “relevance”). 
 6. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 181 (7th ed. 2011). 
 7. CHRISTOPHER MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE 234-35 (6th ed. 2018); see also CHARLES TILFORD 
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 463 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d 
ed. 1972); ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS 
APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 296 (4th ed. 2018). 
 8. Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing physician habit in the 
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critical that a specific stimulus and a corresponding response can be discretely 
identified.”9 Examples of conduct indicative of habit include walking down stairs 
in a particular fashion, and signaling while driving an automobile10—essentially 
conduct undertaken without thought. 
This discussion invites attention to the intersection of habit evidence and the 
practice of medicine. Do physicians engage in “nonvolitional [professional] 
activity that occurs with invariable regularity”11 such that they may avail 
themselves of habit evidence in defense of medical negligence claims? 
Conversely, should medical negligence plaintiffs be able to use physician habit 
evidence to establish that defendant-physicians violated applicable standards of 
care? Or is medical treatment so necessarily patient specific, by virtue of 
involving the exercise of patient-specific thought and judgment, that the concept 
of “physician habit” is a misnomer? 
This Article focuses on multiple physician habit evidence topics, including: 
medical judgment, the “requirement” of nonvolitional conduct, the sources of 
physician habit evidence and jurisprudence developed in the state and federal 
courts. Additionally, this paper concentrates on physician habit in non-informed 
consent litigation. The plan, therefore, is to explore the topic to determine 
whether physician habit evidence is a realistic evidentiary topic. 
I. PHYSICIAN HUMANISM—CHARACTER VS. HABIT 
Authors from the University of Pennsylvania have noted that “[h]umanism 
in medicine combines scientific knowledge and skills with respectful, 
compassionate care that is sensitive to the values, autonomy, and cultural 
backgrounds of patients and their families.”12 They identified the following 
“habits” which support the humanistic practice of medicine: self-reflection, 
seeking connection with patients, teaching/role modeling humanism, striving to 
achieve balance, mindfulness and spiritual practice.13 
The identification of these “habits” requires a discussion of the distinction 
between character traits and habits. This distinction is necessary to an 
understanding of the inadmissibility of character evidence and the admissibility 
 
context of medical negligence). It should be noted that not all courts require non-volitional conduct 
as a condition of admissibility. The volitional nature of the conduct in question may “go to 
weight . . . not admissibility.” Rosebrock v. E. Shore Emergency Physicians, LLC, 221 Md. App. 1, 
20-22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015). 
 9. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 6, at 182. 
 10. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 234-35; MCCORMICK supra note 7, at 462. 
 11. Weil, 873 F.2d at 1460. 
 12. Carol M. Chou et al., Attitudes and Habits of Highly Humanistic Physicians, 89 ACAD. 
MED. 1252, 1252 (2014). 
 13. Id. at 1254. 
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of habit evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) provides: 
Rule 404―Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts 
(a) Character Evidence. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or 
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or 
trait.14 
“[I]t is understood that character, for evidentiary purposes, 
means ‘that the person has an ingrained propensity to act in a 
certain way.’”15 Many commentators have explained the reasons 
for the underlying the inadmissibility of character evidence. I 
have previously provided the following example and 
explanation: 
[T]wo automobiles, driven by A and B, collide in a traffic-
controlled intersection. Driver A has been involved in previous 
traffic accidents and has received traffic citations for poor 
driving—failure to conform to the traffic laws. Driver A tends to 
drive carelessly. Driver A’s propensity, in this regard, is 
inadmissible to prove negligence in the intersection collision 
litigation. Driver A’s prior carelessness does not prove the 
Driver A caused the intersection collision. In fact, Driver B may 
have caused the collision.16 
●   ●   ●   ●   ● 
What is the harm of allowing Driver B to “prove” Driver A’s careless 
character trait? It has been explained that there are two justifications for this 
exclusionary rule: (1) the evidence may be too influential on the jury, and (2) 
“the prevention of nullification prejudice,”—the idea that the jury will use 
character evidence to reach a verdict despite evidence suggesting a different 
result.* Another equally cogent explanation is that: “character evidence carries a 
very high intuitive value . . . [t]his raises the distinct possibility that the jury will 
 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 15. Marc D. Ginsberg, An Evidentiary Oddity: “Careful Habit” – Does the Law of Evidence 
Embrace This Archaic/Modern Concept?, 43 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 293, 297 (2017) (citing Glen 
Weissberger, Character Evidence Under the Federal Rules: A Puzzle with Missing Pieces, 48 CIN. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)). 
 16. Id. at 297. 
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greatly overvalue character evidence as a predictor of conduct, and make an 
inaccurate assessment of the facts.”17 
It is quite clear that the concern with inadmissible character evidence in 
medical negligence litigation has been recognized for well more than one 
hundred years.18 
I mention these fundamentals of character evidence in an admittedly 
circuitous attempt to urge that the six previously mentioned “habits” supporting a 
humanistic practice of medicine19 are not habits as contemplated by Rule 406.20 
Instead, they are inadmissible character traits governed by Rule 404.21 
Insofar as Rule 40622 requires semi-automatic or non-volitional conduct,23 it 
is fair to question whether physicians demonstrate professional habitual conduct 
at all. Patients are not fungible, and often require individualized treatment. Sir 
William Osler, a preeminent physician, notes: “Variability is the law of life, and 
as no two faces are the same, so no two bodies are alike, and no two individuals 
react alike and behave alike under the abnormal conditions which we know as 
disease.”24 Osler, therefore, suggests the need for thought and judgment in the 
treatment of patients. If so, is medical treatment consistent with semi-automatic 
or non-volitional conduct? 
II. ONCE IS NOT ENOUGH—HABIT REQUIRES REPETITION 
It seems intuitively obvious that habit evidence requires proof of repetition. 
At least one appellate court, in a medical negligence context, has made this point. 
In Gerke v. Norwalk Clinic,25 a patient commenced a medical negligence claim 
 
 17. Id. at 298 (citing Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on 
Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1914, 1928-29 (2012) (quoting Roger C. Park, Character at the 
Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 745 (1998)); Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the 
Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 223-24 (1996); David P. Leonard, The Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 305, 311 (1995)). 
 18. See Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534 (1886) (discussing the impropriety of asking a defense 
medical witness about the defendant-physician’s “reputation . . . in the community, and amongst 
the profession, as being an ordinarily skillful and learned physician”). 
 19. Chou et al., supra note 12. 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 406. 
 21. Id. at 404. 
 22. Id. at 406. 
 23. But see, Rosebrock, 221 Md. App. 1; Aikman v. Kanda, 975 A.2d 152 (D.C. 2009) 
(parenthetical would be helpful here, please!). 
 24. SIR WILLIAM OSLER, On the Educational Value of the Medical Society, in AEQUANIMITAS: 
WITH OTHER ADDRESSES TO MEDICAL STUDENTS, NURSES AND PRACTITIONERS OF MEDICINE, p. 3 
(1914); see also Mary V. Seeman & Robert E. Becker, Osler and the Way We Were Taught, 27 
MED. SCI. EDUC. 555, 556 (2017). As to Osler’s prominence as a physician, see Richard L. Golden, 
M.D., William Osler at 150: An Overview of a Life, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2252 (1999). 
 25. Gerke v. Norwalk Clinic, Inc., 2006-Ohio-5621, ¶ 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
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against a physician and clinic for improper treatment of an ovarian cyst.26 At 
trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. 
During trial, plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence of the 
defendant-physician’s treatment of plaintiff’s cyst eleven years earlier to 
demonstrate how the physician treated plaintiff in 1999. The Court of Appeals 
easily disposed of plaintiff’s position, stating that: 
In order for evidence of habit to be admissible, it must establish 
a regular or routine practice. Evidence as to one or two isolated 
occurrences does not establish a sufficient regular practice of 
admission pursuant to Evid.R.406. [citations omitted]. 
Here, appellant attempts to use a single act . . . to show that 
[defendant-physician] acted similarly in 1999 . . . The 1988 
treatment is a single occurrence and does not establish a regular 
practice as required by Evid.R.406.27 
There was nothing surprising or improper about the trial court’s exclusion of 
the proposed “habit” evidence and the Court of Appeals’ approval of the ruling. 
For habit to exist, evidence of repetition is required. 
III. PHYSICIAN JUDGMENT AND VOLITION 
Physician judgment is no stranger to the medical literature.28 It is central to 
the practice of medicine. “Judgment has been defined as the ability to make 
correct decisions with uncertain, incomplete, or inconsistent information.”29 The 
primacy of medical clinical judgment has been explained as follows: 
A basis of this profession is clinical judgment. It lies at the heart 
of the doctor’s connoisseurship, expertise and skills, being 
 
 26. “An ovarian cyst is a sac or pouch filled with fluid or other tissue that forms in or on an 
ovary.” What is an Ovarian Cyst?, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, 
https://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Ovarian-Cysts?IsMobileSet=false (last visited Aug. 14, 
2019). 
 27. Gerke, 2006 WL 3041095, at *12. 
 28. See Michael Accad & Darrel Francis, Does Evidence Based Medicine Adversely Affect 
Clinical Judgment?, 362 BRITISH MED. J. 1 (2018); Gunver S. Kienle & Helmut Kiene, Clinical 
Judgment and the Medical Profession, 17 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 621 (2011); Christopher 
A. Feddock, The Lost Art of Clinical Skills, 120 AM. J. MED. 374 (2007); Mark R. Tonelli, The 
Philosophical Limits of Evidence-based Medicine, 73 ACAD. MED. 1234 (1998); Harold Laufman, 
Some Thoughts on Surgical Judgment, 38 SURGICAL CLINICS N. AM. 1171 (1958); Robert M. 
Bartlett, The Teaching of Surgical Judgment, 121 AM. J. SURGERY 220 (1971); John R. Clarke, 
Decision Making in Surgical Practice, 13 WORLD J. SURGERY 245 (1989). 
 29. Clarke, supra note 28, at 245. 
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‘almost as important as the technical ability to carry out the 
procedure itself.’ Clinical judgment is developed through 
practice, experience, knowledge and continuous critical analysis. 
It extends into all medical areas: diagnosis, therapy, 
communication and decision making.30 
Surgical judgment has been the focus of comment for many years. It has 
been referred to as “the most vital single factor in the practice of surgery—the 
judgment on which treatment is based.”31 It is “a special form of clinical 
judgment consisting of the decisions whether or not to operate and what 
operation to perform.”32 
The concepts of clinical and surgical judgment fit well with Osler’s 
teachings of patient individuality. Consider the following commentary, more than 
sixty years ago, on the obligations of a surgeon, emphasizing the need: 
[T]o know that there is no such thing as an “average” patient. 
Even the most ‘ordinary’ patient with the “simplest” lesion has 
certain sensitivities, stresses, patterns peculiarly his own, 
requiring the surgeon’s individual attention to his particular 
problem. 
A surgeon who works in the climate of this basic attitude will be 
swiftly and sensitively respondent to unexpected reactions and 
events for which surgeons who think in stereotypes may be 
unprepared.33 
●   ●   ●   ●   ● 
Even as a patient must not be regarded as ‘average,’ so the 
tendency to regard procedures as ‘routine’ must be avoided. . . . 
It suggests an unthinking, undifferentiating stereotypy in the 
surgeon’s attitude which will, if adopted, obviate any real 
potential for what is called surgical judgment.34 
If volition “refers to the capacity of humans . . . to initiate actions based on 
internal decision and motivation, rather than external stimulation,”35 it may be 
 
 30. Kienle & Kiene, supra note 28, at 621 (internal citations omitted). 
 31. Fred R. Fairchild, Surgical Judgment, 24 CAL. & W. MED. 471, 471 (1926). 
 32. Clarke, supra note 28, at 245. 
 33. Laufman, supra note 28, at 1173. 
 34. Id. at 1174. 
 35. Patrick Haggard & Hakwan Lau, What is Volition?, 229 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 285, 
285 (2013). 
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fair to suggest that the exercise of judgment is inextricably bound to volitional 
actions. If this analysis is viable, physicians do not treat patients through non-
volitional conduct seemingly required to establish habit evidence pursuant to 
Rule 406.36 
IV. IS NON-VOLITIONAL PHYSICIAN CONDUCT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH 
EVIDENCE OF PHYSICIAN HABIT? 
There is case law to support the proposition that a physician’s volitional 
conduct does not defeat an effort to utilize that conduct to establish evidence of 
habit.37 In Aikman v. Kanda, the defendant cardiac surgeon repaired plaintiff’s 
mitral valve38 through an open-heart procedure. Post-operatively, plaintiff 
developed multiple complications and sued the defendant, “contending that her 
injuries resulted from air that accumulated in her heart while it was open during 
the surgery and that traveled to her brain[.]”39 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant surgeon “either failed to employ procedures to remove air from her 
heart (so-called ‘air drill’ procedures) before completing the surgery, or 
performed the air drill inadequately.”40 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
surgeon.41 
On appeal, plaintiff claimed error in that the surgeon was permitted to testify 
to his habit (or routine practice) of performing an intraoperative procedure to 
remove air from plaintiff’s heart. The basis of the alleged evidentiary error was 
“that there was no contemporaneous notation in [plaintiff’s] medical records 
indicating that [the surgeon] had performed an air drill before completing the 
surgery.”42 Furthermore, “by the time the lawsuit was filed, no one on the 
surgical team could specifically recall the details of [plaintiff’s] surgery.”43 
The surgeon’s trial testimony insofar as it related to habit was explained as 
follows: 
 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 406. 
 37. Rosebrock, 221 Md. App. 1; Aikman, 975 A.2d. 152. 
 38. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 155. 
 39. Heart “valves prevent the backward flow of blood.” Anatomy and Function of the Heart 
Valves, JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-
diseases (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). The mitral “valve is located between the left atrium and the left 
ventricle.” Id. 
 40. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 155. The court’s description suggests that plaintiff alleged central 
nervous damage resulting from air embolization during heart surgery. See Jens Tingleff et al., 
Intraoperative Echocardiographic Study of Air Embolism During Cardiac Operations, 60 ANNALS 
THORACIC SURGERY 673 (1995); Jean-Paul Dalmas et al., Intracardiac Air Cleaning in Valvular 
Surgery Guided by Transesophageal Echocardiography, 5 J. HEART VALVE DISEASE 553, 555 
(1996). 
 41. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 155. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 157. 
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[He] explained during . . . trial that he performed the air drill 
“100 percent of the time” as an “integral part” of mitral valve 
surgery, but he attributed his inability to recall his actions during 
[plaintiff’s] surgery to his having performed over 500 mitral 
valve operations over the course of his career (with an average of 
forty or fifty such procedures each year).44 
The Court of Appeals referred to the often-pronounced nature of habit 
evidence as a “regular response to a repeated situation to the point where the 
doing of the habitual act may become semi-automatic,”45 and noted the 
defendant-surgeon’s testimony as follows: 
[He] established that he had performed more than 500 mitral 
valve operations . . . and he testified that the air drill “is an 
integral part of the procedure. So, I do it every time.” In addition, 
[he] described his air drill routine step by step, and in great 
detail, and described his specific responses to various triggers 
and developments that occur over the course of the procedure . . . 
[I]n light of the high . . . “ratio of reactions to situations” that 
[he] described and the specificity of his account of his routine, 
we cannot conclude that [the court] erred in determining that, for 
[him] the air drill was semi-automatic in nature.46 
It is not clear from the Court’s recitation of the surgeon’s testimony that 
each “trigger and development” occurs with every patient. If this is so, it is fair to 
suggest that the air drill procedure involves volition and judgment. On the other 
hand, if an air drill procedure is always performed during mitral valve surgery, 
the performance is automatic, even if the details of performance may vary among 
patients. 
In any event, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court “that the 
volitional nature of habitual conduct is relevant to its probative force, not its 
admissibility.”47 This approach relaxes the evidentiary burden on physicians 
seeking to introduce habit evidence. 
Aikman v. Kanda was recently cited, with approval, in Rosebrock v. E. Shore 
Emergency Physicians, LLC.48 In Rosebrock, a nurses’ aide “slipped and fell on a 
wet floor in a patient’s room” in a nursing home.49 The evidentiary issue was 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 163. 
 47. Id. at 163. 
 48. Rosebrock, 221 Md. App. 1. 
 49. Id. at 5. 
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whether a physician could testify regarding his routine examination for a patient 
on a backboard.50 After testifying that he treated multiple “patients per shift who 
were presented by ambulance on a backboard,”51 that annually he saw thousands 
of patients, “and conduct[ed] a spine examination on every patient on a 
backboard before removal,”52 he further testified that: 
I do the same process every time I have a patient on the 
backboard. The nurses don’t take patients off the backboard. The 
paramedics don’t take them off the backboard. It’s only the 
physician that can, what we call, clear the spine and I do it the 
same way, every single time, every day that I work.53 
On appeal, the appellant urged that the physician’s trial testimony did not 
meet the requirements of habit because the physician’s examination of patients 
positioned on backboards was “variable activity which requires thought and 
decision making,”54 essentially arguing that the patient examination involved 
volitional conduct.55 The Court rejected appellant’s position, citing Aikman v. 
Kanda,56 specifically referring to that court’s holding that the volitional nature of 
medical treatment relates to weight, not admissibility of habit evidence.57 
Volitional conduct/semi-automatic conduct by physicians is not always 
viewed so charitably by courts with respect to habit evidence. Very recently, the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio considered unique patient presentations and individual 
patient assessments as mitigating against acceptable semi-automatic conduct or 
“responsive behavior to a repeated stimulus” necessary to establish admissible 
physician habit.58 
Similarly, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently commented on the 
nature of emergency medicine treatment59 as non-habitual conduct: 
[T]he manner in which [the defendant-physician] treated patients 
with Decedent’s symptoms was not reflexive, instinctive, semi-
automatic or mundane in nature. Medical patients are not 
 
 50. For a paper on the use of backboards for spinal immobilization, see Derek Cooney et al., 
Backboard Time for Patients Receiving Spinal Immobilization by Emergency Medical Services, 6 
INT’L J. EMERGENCY MED. 17 (2013). 
 51. Rosebrock, 221 Md. App. at 21. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 163-63. 
 57. Rosebrock, 221 Md. App. at 22. 
 58. Robinson v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 113 N.E. 3d 1100, 1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
 59. Sutch v. Roxborough Mem’l Hosp., 151 A.3d 241, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). 
12




manufactured on assembly lines; they each have unique 
attributes and idiosyncrasies that call for individualized care. The 
notion that [the defendant-physician] treats each patient with 
Decedent’s symptoms as reflexively as, for example, the manner 
in which he climbs stairs is preposterous. His proposed 
testimony fell well outside the boundaries of Pa.R.E. 406.60 
In Figueroa v. Highline Medical Center,61 the Court of Appeals of 
Washington reviewed a trial court’s exclusion of proposed habit evidence from 
the defendant-emergency medicine physician. On appeal from an adverse verdict, 
the defendant-physician urged “that the trial court improperly precluded him 
from testifying as to his habit and routine practice of orally instructing patients 
with compartment syndrome.”62 
The Court of Appeals referred to Washington state precedent and noted that 
“not all behavior claimed as regular and consistent in similar circumstances is 
admissible as habit evidence[.]”63 The Court of Appeals characterized the 
defendant-physician’s conduct as “not consistent and automatic.”64 The physician 
had not encountered this medical condition “either before or since [the 
patient].”65 Accordingly, the defendant-physician’s proposed testimony did not 
rise to the level of habit evidence. 
In Glusaskas v. Hutchinson,66 the New York Appellate Division reviewed 
and reversed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant-cardiovascular surgeon. 
Curiously, the trial court admitted in evidence “a videotape prepared exclusively 
for trial by defendant physician of a surgery performed by him on another 
patient.”67 Apparently, the trial court “permitted the use of the tape . . . , ruling 
that it was sufficiently relevant to show the jury how the procedure was 
done[.]”68 The appellate opinion clearly reveals that the videotaped surgical 
procedure involved a patient of a different sex, a different age, and with a 
different physical condition than the patient at issue.69 Although the defendant-
physician believed the videotape would assist in educating the jury, the Appellate 
 
 60. Id. at 252-53. 
 61. Figueroa v. Highline Med. Ctr., No. 68272-5-1, 2013 WL 5636674, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Oct. 14, 2013). 
 62. Id. at *4. For an excellent discussion of compartment syndrome, see Kirsten G.B. Elliott & 
Alan J. Johnstone, Diagnosing Acute Compartment Syndrome, 85 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 625 
(2003). 
 63. Figueroa, 2013 WL 5636674, at *2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Glusaskas v. Hutchinson, 148 A.D.2d 203, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 67. Id. at 204. 
 68. Id. at 205. 
 69. Id. 
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Division concluded that “it is evident that the actual effect of exhibiting the film, 
if not the defendant’s unexpressed intention, was to endeavor to persuade the jury 
that because he had carefully and successfully operated on another heart patient, 
he had applied the same degree of care”70 during the surgery he performed for the 
patient at issue. 
The Appellate Division was not impressed by the defendant-physician’s 
rationale. It commented that “proof of regular usage or habit might be warranted 
where deliberate and repetitive practice is involved”71 but physicians performing 
surgery treat patients with unique medical conditions and that “the actions of the 
operating doctor”72 are unique, as well. 
The point here is that habit evidence is in the eye of the beholder. Physician 
conduct is different than one’s habit of stopping the car at a red light, always 
locking the door upon leaving home, or descending stairs one step at a time. 
Understanding that there is no bright line test for the admissibility of physician 
habit evidence, this paper will now focus on the sources of physician habit 
evidence and the various contexts in which physician habit evidence has been 
admitted in evidence. 
V. SOURCES OF PHYSICIAN HABIT EVIDENCE 
As mentioned earlier, Rule 406 does not specify sources of habit evidence. It 
is fair to expect that physician habit evidence would derive from the physician’s 
own testimony about the physician’s practice habit. The physician is the obvious 
choice as the witness to testify about their own practice habits. In various 
jurisdictions, courts have considered whether patients, nurses, physician staff, 
and records can be the source of physician habit evidence. These less obvious but 
potentially controversial sources of habit evidence are worthy of attention here. 
A. Patients 
Whether a physician’s patient or patients can be the source of physician 
habit evidence raises serious evidentiary concerns. A patient, even a series of 
patients, only are aware of their respective experiences. If patient testimony is a 
theoretical source of physician habit evidence, how many patients must testify to 
establish evidence of habit? The text of Rule 406 does not speak to this question. 
Additionally, patients, as lay persons, do not have the knowledge, skill or 
expertise to testify about medical treatment or conditions. As non-expert 
 
 70. Id. at 205-06. 
 71. Id. at 206. 
 72. Id. 
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witnesses,73 patients are very likely unqualified to testify to the detail necessary 
to establish physician habit. Furthermore, the testimony of a physician’s other 
patients’ experiences runs the risk of implicating impermissible character 
evidence, inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404.74 
This having been said, some courts have embraced patient testimony as the 
source of physician habit evidence. That jurisprudence is now addressed. 
1. Patients Permitted to Provide Physician Habit Evidence 
In Crawford v. Fayez, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina approved the 
trial court’s decision pursuant to which “five of defendant’s former patients were 
permitted to testify . . . that defendant had informed them of Medrol’s75 possible 
side effects, including bone damage.”76 Predictably, plaintiff contended “that 
‘habit’ may not be proven by the testimony of a succession of witnesses who 
observed the behavior in question on a single occasion”77 and requires proof “by 
the testimony of a witness who has regularly observed the habitual behavior.”78 
The Court of Appeals referred to the state’s evidentiary rule 40679 and noted 
(as with Federal Rule of Evidence 406) its silence “as to the methods by which 
the existence of habit may be proven[.]”80 It then precisely raised the issue on 
appeal, as follows: “It is unclear, however, whether habit may be shown by a 
succession of witnesses who observed the relevant conduct on separate, single 
occasions.”81 
To address this issue, the Court of Appeals purported to review and consider 
federal authority regarding Rule 406 and concluded that the trial testimony of 
defendant’s former patients was permissible to establish habit.82 Specifically, the 
Court of Appeals referred to Wetherill v. University of Chicago,83 a case 
 
 73. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 74. FED. R. EVID. 404; see also Marc D. Ginsberg, Good Medicine/Bad Medicine and the Law 
of Evidence: Is There A Role For Proof of Character, Propensity, or Prior Bad Conduct in Medical 
Negligence Litigation?, 63 S.C.L. REV. 367 (2011). 
 75. See Akbar K. Waljee et al., Short Term Use of Oral Corticosteroids and Related Harms 
Among Adults in the United States: Population Based Cohort Study, 357 BRITISH MED. J. j1415 
(2017). It is unclear how, precisely, this supports your statement. Are you offering examples of side 
effects? If so, consider adding this at the end of the sentence and elaborating more in a 
parenthetical. 
 76. Crawford v. Fayez, 112 N.C. App. 328, 331 (1993). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 406 (2018). 
 80. Crawford, 112 N.C. App. at 332. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 336. 
 83. Wetherill v. Univ. of Chi., 570 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
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involving a claim of “injury by exposure in utero to diethylstilbestrol (“DES”)84 
administered to . . . mothers as part of a study . . . conducted in the early 1950s at 
the University of Chicago . . . hospitals.”85 It is true that in Wetherill patients 
were permitted to testify regarding a “routine practice of securing [patient] 
consent;”86 however, physicians testified as well. The Crawford court omitted 
this reference to physician testimony when holding that the testimony at trial of 
five of defendant’s former patients was sufficient to establish physician habit.87 
Patient testimony to establish physician habit was also approved in Hall v. 
Arthur.88 Here, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an informed 
consent claim in the context of a neurosurgical procedure, “an anterior cervical 
discectomy and fusion[.]”89 At trial, the court permitted “testimony from patients 
other than [plaintiff] concerning what [defendant] told them about [disk 
replacement material] prior to surgery.”90 Without citation to authority other than 
Rule 406, the Eighth Circuit held that this testimony “was properly admitted 
under Fed. R. Evid. 406, as evidence of the routine practice of an organization.”91 
Frankly, unless the Eighth Circuit was implicating an informed consent process 
utilized by the medical center at which the defendant practiced medicine, it 
seems that the Eighth Circuit should have approved the patients’ testimony as 
evidence of habit of a physician, not as evidence of the routine practice of an 
organization. 
2. Patients Not Permitted to Provide Physician Habit Evidence 
Not all courts are receptive to permitting patient testimony as evidence of 
physician habit. Of course, a danger of patient testimony is the admission of 
character evidence, prohibited by Rule 404 and state counterparts. An additional 
evidentiary concern is “relevance.” A physician’s treatment of any single patient 
is not logically related to the treatment of another patient. 
 
 84. See Linda Titus et al., Birth Defects in the Sons and Daughters of Women Who Were 
Exposed in Utero to Diethylstilbestrol (DES), 33 INT’L J. ANDROLOGY 377 (2010). 
 85. Wetherill, 570 F. Supp. at 1125. 
 86. Id. at 1127. 
 87. Crawford, 112 N.C. App. at 331. 
 88. Hall v. Arthur, 141 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 89. Id. at 847. For literature regarding the use of anterior cervical discectomy and fusion to 
treat cervical spine disorders, see Rahul Yadav et al., Post-Operative Complications in Patients 
Undergoing Anterior Cervical Discectomy and Fusion: A Retrospective Review, 4 J. 
NEUROANAESTHESIOLOGY & CRITICAL CARE 170 (2017). 
 90. Hall, 141 F.3d at 849. 
 91. Id. 
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a. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
In Weil v. Seltzer,92 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit framed the 
appellate issue as follows: “whether the district court erred in permitting the 
testimony of five of the defendant’s former patients in order to establish the 
defendant’s habit and routine practice of prescribing steroids to his patients.”93 
This issue arose from medical negligence litigation involving a physician who 
allegedly “prescribed steroids to [the patient] on his first visit in 1963 and 
continued to prescribe steroids over a period of more than twenty years.”94 The 
Court of Appeals opinion reveals an astounding amount of steroid tablets 
purchased by the treating physician. Apparently, he routinely advised patients 
that the prescribed tablets were antihistamines and decongestants, not steroids.95 
The medical negligence claim against the defendant-physician was tried 
twice, the second trial yielding a verdict for plaintiff. It was during this trial that 
five former patients of the defendant-physician were permitted to testify to 
establish “that [defendant-physician] had prescribed steroids to other allergy 
patients while representing the drugs to be antihistamines or decongestants.”96 
The Court of Appeals undertook an extensive analysis of habit evidence 
pursuant to Rule 406. In so doing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the non-
volitional nature of habit: “activity that occurs with invariable regularity,”97 a 
“consistent method or manner of responding to a particular stimulus,”98 with a 
“reflexive, almost instinctive quality.”99 The Court of Appeals questioned 
whether the defendant-physician’s treatment of other patients as explained by the 
patients, would satisfy the need for proof of a physician’s conduct with sufficient 
regularity.100 
The Court of Appeals focused on the patients’ inability to know how the 
defendant-physician treated other patients. It noted that “[f]or the former patient 
testimony to be at all probative [of physician habit] it must show that [the 
defendant-physician] responded the same way with each patient as he did with 
the testifying patient.”101 As the testimony of the former patients did not establish 
physician habit, the testimony constituted character evidence, which was 
 
 92. Weil, 873 F.2d 1453. 
 93. Id. at 1455. 
 94. Id. at 1456. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1460. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1461. 
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inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404.102 Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals vacated the district court’s judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff.103 
b. California 
A California Court of Appeal considered the issue of patient supplied, 
physician habit evidence in Jackson v. Hajj,104 a case involving a medical 
negligence claim against a surgeon who performed disk compression surgery for 
a patient with a herniated lumbar disk.105 Regrettably, post-operatively, the 
patient suffered serious complications and died.106 The apparent cause of death 
was a lacerated abdominal aorta which occurred during surgery.107 
At trial, “the court had excluded evidence . . . of an allegedly similar 
misadventure with another patient, which took place some time after the 
decedent’s surgery.”108 Plaintiff offered this evidence to establish the custom and 
habit of the surgeon.109 
The Court of Appeal held that plaintiff’s proposed evidence “was manifestly 
insufficient . . . to establish any ‘habit’ or ‘custom’ of [the defendant]”110 but 
used somewhat equivocal language in so holding. In finding a lack of evidentiary 
foundation for habit evidence, the Court of Appeal stated that plaintiff “never 
sought to elicit any evidence from [the defendant-physician]—or from any other 
competent source—to establish [defendant-physician’s] actual habits or 
customs.”111 The Court of Appeal never suggested the identity of another 
competent source for evidence of habit. The Court of Appeal also noted that 
plaintiff’s expert witness would “not have had any actual knowledge of 
[defendant’s] habits and customs.”112 Additionally, it commented on the 
impossibility of attempting to compare the other patient to the decedent and that 
the other “patient’s surgery involved a different portion of the spine, and resulted 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Jackson v. Hajj, No. E030178, 2003 WL 21329772 (Cal. Ct. App. June 10, 2003). 
 105. Id. at *3. For a paper discussing this surgery, see Mahsa Sedighi & Ali Haghnegahdar, 
Lumbar Disk Herniation Surgery: Outcome and Predictors, 4 GLOBAL SPINE J. 233 (2014); see also 
N.K. Anjarwalla et al., The Outcome of Spinal Decompression Surgery 5 Years On, 16 EUR. SPINE 
J. 1842 (2007). 
 106. Jackson, 2003 WL 21329772, at *3. 
 107. Id. This intra operative injury has been reported in the medical literature. See W. Roy 
Smythe & Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Upper Abdominal Aortic Injury During Spinal Surgery, 25 J. 
VASCULAR SURGERY 774 (1997). 
 108. Jackson, 2003 WL 21329772, at *7. 
 109. Id. at *3-4. 
 110. Id. at *4. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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in injury to a different vessel[.]”113 
The Court of Appeal reached the correct decision in Jackson v. Hajj. 
Clearly, the defendant-surgeon would have been the appropriate source of 
evidence to establish his habit (if he had offered such evidence). The reference to 
an unidentified potential other source of habit evidence was curious. 
c. Louisiana 
In Joseph v. Williams,114 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana reviewed a 
podiatry malpractice claim in which the trial court granted the defendant’s 
“motion in limine to exclude the testimony of his former patient, . . . in 
[plaintiff’s] case-in-chief.”115 Plaintiff’s strategy in proposing this testimony, 
along with her own, was to “establis[h] that [the podiatrist] had a habit of 
persuading patients to submit to surgery based on his failure to disclose the risks 
of surgery.”116 The podiatrist was permitted “to testify as to his habit . . . in 
obtaining informed consent[.]”117 The Court of Appeals noted the propriety of the 
podiatrist’s own habit testimony at trial118 and that “the former patient’s 
testimony was inadmissible other similar acts (character) evidence.”119 
d. Ohio 
In Cardinal v. Family Foot Care Centers., Inc.,120 the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio considered a defense verdict in a podiatry malpractice case. An evidentiary 
issue was whether plaintiff should have been permitted “to introduce the 
testimony of several former patients who would have testified that they were 
cajoled into unnecessary surgery by the [sic] [defendants].”121 Without any 
particular analysis, the Court of Appeals referred to Ohio Evidence Rule 406 and 
held that “[t]he testimony in the instant case did not rise to the level of habit.”122 
e. Texas 
In Pisharodi v. Saldana,123 the Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Joseph v. Williams, 105 So.3d 207 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 115. Id. at 218. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 219. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 40 Ohio App. 3d 181 (1987). 
 121. Id. at 182. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Pisharodi v. Saldana, No. 13-13-00721-CV, 2015 WL 7352301 (Tex. Civ. App. Nov. 19, 
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plaintiff’s verdict in a medical negligence claim against a neurosurgeon relating 
to the patient’s death following a lumbar epidural steroid injection.124 At trial, the 
court permitted another patient in the defendant’s office at the same time as the 
deceased to testify “about what he observed and experienced that day as a 
patient, including what he heard and saw after [decedent’s] collapse, and the 
extent of care that Dr. Pisharodi provided to [the other patient].”125 This 
testimony was permitted despite a habit evidence126 objection. The defendant 
urged “that testimony from [a] lay witness . . . was improper habit evidence 
because it would have been impossible for [him] to know what was done as a 
matter of routine with all of Dr. Pisharodi’s patient[s] from his one and only 
encounter as a patient.’”127 
The Court of Appeals essentially held that the other patient’s testimony was 
not impermissible habit evidence and that this patient testified to his 
observations. One wonders why this patient was allowed to testify about “the 
extent of care that Dr. Pisharodi provided to [him].”128 The care rendered to one 
patient does not tend to prove any relevant fact relating to the care rendered to 
another patient. 
The above jurisdictional survey supports the position that patients should not 
constitute a permissible source of physician habit evidence. Patients are simply 
not qualified to testify regarding the details of medical care and treatment. They 
are able to testify from their personal knowledge about their experiences with a 
physician, but it is unlikely that they can testify to medical terminology, and their 
personal treatment experiences are not relevant to the experiences of other 
patients. Even a large number of patients treated by the same physician cannot 
overcome these obstacles. Each can only testify, as lay witnesses, to their 
personal physician encounters. Patients are not a valid source for physician habit 
evidence. 
B. Nurses 
Physicians and nurses work together in various clinical settings.129 Certainly, 
there are nurses who frequently work with particular physicians and have 
 
2015). 
 124. Lumber epidural steroid injections are commonly used to treat low back pain. See James 
Fredrich & Mark A. Harrast, Lumbar Epidural Steroid Injections: Indications, Contraindications, 
Risks, and Benefits, 9 CURRENT SPORTS MED. REP. 44 (2010). 
 125. Pisharodi, 2015 WL 7352301, at *16. 
 126. FED. R. EVID. 406. 
 127. Pisharodi, 2015 WL 7352301, at *16. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See generally Robert Boissoneau, et al., A National Study: The Use of Specialty Surgical 
Teams, 17 HEALTH MKT. Q. 49 (1999) (explaining the reasons for the development of specialty 
surgical teams, including the need or specialized nursing). 
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observed their practices over a period of time. Courts have correctly concluded 
that nurses are appropriate sources of physician habit evidence. 
1. Massachusetts 
In Elias v. Suran, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a jury 
verdict in favor of a defendant-neuroradiologist.130 It framed the only appellate 
issue as follows: “whether the trial judge erred by admitting in evidence . . . the 
testimony of a nurse at the Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) about the 
routine practice in 1981 at MGH for administering morphine sulfate to patients 
undergoing angiograms.”131 
At the trial, a nurse was permitted to testify for the defendant-physician 
regarding the MGH practice of “premedicat[ing] nonemergency angiogram 
patients with five milligrams of morphine intramuscularly before they came to 
the department and to premedicate emergency angiogram patients in the 
neuroradiology department with three milligrams of morphine sulfate 
intravenously.”132 The testifying nurse had about nine years of experience in the 
neuroradiology department before the events at issue.133 
The Appellate Court noted that the nurse’s testimony “was relevant to 
corroborate the defendant’s testimony”134 regarding the administration of the 
medication. Interestingly, the Massachusetts law of evidence did not permit the 
admission of habit evidence to prove conduct consistent with the habit, but it did 
permit “evidence of a business custom . . . to show that an act was performed in 
conformity with the custom.”135 The Appeals Court approved the nurse’s 
testimony as she did not refer to a specific physician’s habit but referred to a 
hospital practice.136 This seems to be a distinction without a difference, as the 
physician who ordered the medication was the defendant. It is clear that his 
prescribing practice would be encompassed by the hospital’s practice. 
2. Illinois 
In Vuletich v. Bolgla, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed a jury verdict 
in favor of a defendant anesthesiologist based on the trial testimony of a surgical 
scrub nurse that the anesthesiologist “had a particular practice and method of 
monitoring a patient’s respiration during surgery when the anesthetic in question 
 
 130. Elias v. Suran, 616 N.E.2d 134, 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
 131. Id. at 135. 
 132. Id. at 135-36. 
 133. Id. at 135. 
 134. Id. at 136. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 135. 
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was being used and that he usually followed that practice.”137 It should be noted 
that the Appellate Court’s opinion pre-dated the Illinois Rules of Evidence by 
many years.138 The opinion noted that Illinois courts frowned on habit evidence 
except in wrongful death cases in which there were no eyewitnesses.139 In that 
exceptional circumstance, Illinois courts developed the unfortunate concept of 
the careful habit. This confuses inadmissible character trait evidence 
(carefulness) with habit evidence. Regrettably, the careful habit remains a part of 
Illinois’ common law of evidence.140 The Vuletich Court noted that physician 
eyewitnesses did testify at trial, “so as to preclude the introduction of the 
evidence of Dr. Bolgla’s habits.”141 
Additionally, the Appellate Court held that even in the absence of 
eyewitness testimony, the nurse’s testimony as to the defendant-
anesthesiologist’s habits would be inadmissible.142 Apparently, this is so because 
the nurse testified to a procedure different than that utilized by the defendant-
anesthesiologist.143 Therefore, it is unclear if the Appellate Court would have 
approved the habit testimony if the nurse and defendant-physician had described 
identical procedures. 
3. Florida 
In Fincke v. Peeples, the District Court of Appeals of Florida held that a 
nurse could not testify regarding a physician’s habit of prematurely extubating 
patients.144 The defendants were an orthopedic surgeon and an 
anesthesiologist.145 The patient underwent knee surgery.146 Post-operatively, the 
patient died and a medical negligence lawsuit was filed, focusing on whether the 
patient had been prematurely extubated.147 
Three nurses testified at trial, two of whom specifically referred to the 
defendants’ practice of prematurely extubating patients.148 Without any detailed 
 
 137. Vuletich v. Bolgla, 407 N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ill. App. 3d 1980). 
 138. The Illinois Rules of Evidence (IRE) became effective on January 1, 2011. IRE 406 does 
govern the admissibility of habit evidence. ILL. R. EVID. 406. 
 139. Vuletich, 407 N.E.2d at 570. 
 140. See Marc D. Ginsberg, An Evidentiary Oddity: “Careful Habit” – Does The Law Of 
Evidence Embrace This Archaic/Modern Concept?, 43 OHIO N. L. REV. 293, 302 (2017). 
 141. Vuletich, 407 N.E.2d at 571. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Fincke v. Peeples, 476 So.2d 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 145. Id. at 1320. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1320-21; see Scott K. Epstein, Extubation Failure: An Outcome To Be Avoided, 8 
CRITICAL CARE 310 (2004). 
 148. Fincke, 476 So.2d at 1321. 
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analysis, the Court of Appeals held that the trial “testimony consisted of nurses’ 
opinions on that question, not facts,” therefore, that testimony was not 
“admissible to show that [the defendant] had a habit of prematurely extubating 
patients.”149 The Court of Appeals did not discuss whether a nurse or nurses 
could be the source of physician habit evidence. 
4. California 
In Dincau v. Tamayose, the California Court of Appeal allowed the 
admission of testimony by a defendant-physician’s nurse to establish the habit of 
the physician and his office in communicating by telephone with parents of ill 
children.150 The Court of Appeal noted that the admission of habit evidence in 
this context was necessary to enable a physician to establish a defense, years after 
an event which prompted the litigation.151 
Nurses may work with physicians in formal practice teams or may otherwise 
work closely with physicians so that they are able to repetitively observe 
physician practices over a substantial period of time.152 Under these 
circumstances, nurses should be permitted to testify and establish physician habit. 
C. Former Medical Assistants 
In Lambert v. Wilkinson, the Court of Appeals of Ohio considered whether a 
trial court correctly precluded two of the defendant-physician’s medical 
assistants from testifying that he had a habit of altering medical records. 153 These 
witnesses had been employees of the defendant-physician in the 1990s and “[o]f 
particular concern at trial was whether [the defendant] altered or fabricated the 
medical chart of [the patient] for his December 18, 2003 office visit.”154 
The Court of Appeals did not provide an analytical discussion of physician 
habit evidence and did not specifically disqualify medical assistants as sources of 
habit evidence.155 The Court of Appeals dismissed the proposed testimony as 
“too remote in time,” noting that “the practice of [the defendant-physician] in the 
1990s does not necessarily establish the existence of the habit and that the 
habitual response occurred on or after December 2003.”156 Although the 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Dincau v. Tamayose, 131 Cal. App. 3d 780, 794 (1982). 
 151. Id. at 795. 
 152. See Kevin Grumbach & Thomas Bodenheimer, Can Health Care Teams Improve 
Primary Care Practice?, 291 JAMA NETWORK 1246 (2004). 
 153. Lambert v. Wilkinson, 2008-Ohio-2915, at ¶ 56 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
 154. Id. at ¶ 69. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. 
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proposed testimony “would have revealed that [the defendant-physician] did, on 
occasion, alter medical records, this does not constitute proof of a regular 
response to a repeated, factually-specific situation.”157 Accordingly, the medical 
assistants’ proposed testimony would have amounted to inadmissible character 
evidence.158 
It was not at all clear from the Court of Appeals’ opinion precisely the detail 
to which the medical assistants were prepared to testify. Apparently, the medical 
assistants would have testified that the defendant-physician requested that one of 
the medical assistants “alter piles of patient medical records so that he would 
avoid criminal penalty.”159 How frequently the alleged medical records 
alterations occurred is unknown. Also unclear is how the medical assistants 
would have known that a physician actually altered medical records. As a result, 
the Court of Appeals correctly held that the proposed testimony was 
inadmissible. 
D. Administrative Records 
A New Jersey Appellate Court confronted the interesting issue of whether 
administrative records of the Board of Medical Examiners could be the source of 
physician habit evidence.160 In Delgaudio v. Rodriguera, the plaintiff’s claim of 
medical negligence against the defendant-cardiologist was based on a 
complication, hemolytic anemia,161 which he allegedly suffered due to a 
medication prescribed by the defendant.162 At trial, “the accuracy and truthfulness 
of defendant’s office record and his say so, was a crucial credibility issue for the 
jury to resolve.”163 
Apparently, the Board of Medical Examiners records contained information 
about “the Board’s 1993 suspension and 1991 revocation decisions and the 
findings and conclusions in connection therewith”164 and the defendant-
physician’s “record-keeping infractions.”165 At trial, plaintiff unsuccessfully 
sought to use these records to establish the defendant-physician’s habit of record-
keeping infractions.166 The appellate court simply stated that “the record is not 
sufficient to show ‘a regular practice of responding to a particular kind of 
 
 157. Id. at ¶ 70. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at ¶ 56. 
 160. See Delgaudio v. Rodriguera, 654 A.2d 1007 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
 161. See Gurpreet Dhaliwal, Patricia Cornett & Lawrence Tierney, Hemolytic Anemia, 69 AM. 
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situation with a specific type of conduct [i.e. habitually failing to record patient 
complaints].’”167 This is a correct result, as, in the absence of detailed, identical 
record-keeping errors occurring in identical circumstances, unrelated record-
keeping errors likely establish an inadmissible character trait of carelessness.168 
E. Physicians 
The defendant-physician is the obvious choice as the most likely source of 
habit evidence. This paper now focuses on the various contexts (other than 
informed consent litigation) in which physician habit evidence has been 
embraced by courts. 
1. Performance of Surgery and Habit 
Medical literature reveals that surgeons are at a higher risk of facing medical 
negligence claims.169 Therefore, it is predictable that surgeons would desire to 
testify about their typical, habitual conduct in the performance of surgical 
procedures. Additionally, non-surgeon physicians who participate in surgical 
procedures, are likely candidates to provide habit testimony. 
In McCormack v. Lindberg, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed a jury 
verdict in favor of a thoracic surgeon.170 The medical negligence claim arose 
from a complication of a rib resection surgery performed to address thoracic 
outlet syndrome.171 At trial, “the defendant . . . testified that he had no present 
recollection of the specific circumstances of [plaintiff’s] operation, but testified 
to his ordinary practices in performing first rib resections in order to establish 
what he probably did during [plaintiff’s] operation.”172 
On appeal, the defendant-physician urged that the aforementioned testimony 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.; See also, Herbstreith v. de Bakker, 249 Kan. 67, 815 P.2d 102, 109 (1991) (noting 
that “any evidence offered to prove a trait of character with respect to care or skill is 
inadmissible . . . as tending to prove the quality of conduct on a specified occasion.”). 
 169. See Anupam B. Jena, Seth Seabury, Darius Lakdawalla & Amithabh Chandra, 
Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 N. ENG. J. MED. 629, 632 (2011); See also 
José R. Guardado, Medical Liability Claim Frequency Among U.S. Physicians, POL’Y RES. PERSP. 
AM. MED. ASS’N. (2017). 
 170. McCormick v. Lingberg, 352 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 171. Id. at 32. “Thoracic outlet syndrome . . . refers to compression of the subclavian vessels 
and brachial plexus at the superior aperture of the chest.” Harold C. Urschel Jr., Transaxillary First 
Rib Resection for Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, OPERATIVE TECH. IN THORACIC & CARDIOVASCULAR 
SURGERY 313, 313 (2005). “The majority of patients . . . have pain of the neck, upper chest wall, 
and upper extremity.” Dean Donahue, Supraclavicular First Rib Resection, OPERATIVE TECH. IN 
THORACIC & CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 252, 252 (2012). 
 172. McCormick, 352 N.W.2d at 32. 
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was admissible habit evidence.173 The Court of Appeals embarked on an 
interesting, if not curious, analysis of habit evidence.174 Since the defendant-
physician testified “that the operation varies depending upon many factors, 
including the size and age of the patient,” the Court of Appeals wondered if the 
operative procedure satisfied the “automatic” nature of habitual conduct.175 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals then stated that it would not address this issue as the 
defendant-physician, also an expert witness, “was not testifying to his usual and 
customary procedure in order to prove that he acted in conformity with it, but 
merely to inform the jury of what such an operation entails.”176 Frankly, it is 
difficult to recognize the distinction urged by the Court of Appeals. Undoubtedly, 
the defendant-physician desired to explain the operative procedure. However, the 
defendant-physician, at least implicitly, desired to establish that he followed the 
appropriate procedures in performing the surgery.177 Since he did not recall 
plaintiff’s operative procedure, he certainly provided habit evidence. 
In Steinberg v. Arcilla, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered an appeal 
of a jury verdict in favor of a defendant-anesthesiologist.178 The plaintiff “had 
emergency surgery for a ruptured tubal pregnancy.”179 The defendant-
anesthesiologist positioned the plaintiff during surgery.180 Post-operatively, the 
plaintiff “suffered from pain and numbness in her arms” and claimed “permanent 
injury to her ulnar nerve, a nerve that runs through her forearm.”181 Plaintiff’s 
theory of liability was that the defendant-anesthesiologist improperly positioned 
her arms during the surgical procedure.182 
At trial, the defendant-anesthesiologist “testified that he did not remember 
anything about [plaintiff’s] surgery, including how he positioned her arms.”183 
However, the trial court permitted him to testify regarding his “normal practice” 
of doing so.184 On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in admitting 
this evidence.185 
 
 173. Id. at 35. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 30. 
 178. Steinberg v. Arcilla, 194 Wis. 2d 759, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 179. Id. “Ectopic pregnancy is any pregnancy that occurs outside the uterine cavity.” Anne-
Marie Lozeau & Beth Potter, Diagnosis and Management of Ectopic Pregnancy, 72 AM. FAM. 
PHYSICIAN 1707, 1707 (2005). A ruptured ectopic pregnancy requires surgical management. Id. 
 180. Steinberg, 194 Wis. 2d at 763. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.; see Richard C. Prielipp et al., Ulnar Nerve Pressure, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 345 (1999) 
(“Ulnar neuropathy is the most common perioperative nerve injury . . . .”). 
 183. Steinberg, 194 Wis. 2d at 764. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 765. 
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, not surprisingly, distinguished habit 
evidence from character evidence.186 It then noted that the “regular response to a 
repeated situation,” denoting habit, “need not be ‘semi-automatic’ or ‘virtually 
unconscious’” under Wisconsin law.187 Furthermore, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals noted that Wisconsin law did not require a specific number of repetitive 
instances to qualify as habitual conduct.188 The defendant-anesthesiologist 
testified as to his usual positioning of a patient’s arms during surgery as well as 
to the frequency of his participation in surgical procedures.189 This testimony was 
appropriate to evidence the defendant-anesthesiologist’s habitual conduct.190 
In Aikman v. Kanda, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered 
the appeal from a jury verdict in favor of a cardiac surgeon who performed 
surgery to repair the plaintiff’s mitral valve.191 Post-operatively, plaintiff suffered 
an embolic stroke, presumably cardiac in origin, and resultant disabilities.192 At 
trial, the issue was whether the cardiac surgeon undertook a procedure to remove 
air from plaintiff’s heart.193 Plaintiff’s medical records did not contain any 
reference to the air removal procedure and “no one on the surgical team could 
specifically recall the details of [plaintiff’s] surgery.”194 
At trial, the defendant-surgeon was permitted to testify that he performs the 
air removal procedure in every mitral valve surgery he performs and that he has 
performed in excess of 500 mitral valve operations, averaging 40-50 of these 
procedures each year.195 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed that the defendant-
surgeon’s testimony was appropriate to establish his semi-automatic habit.196 On 
the issue of whether the performance of a cardiac surgical procedure is a non-
volitional event, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that “the volitional nature of 
habitual conduct is relevant to its probative force, not its admissibility.”197 
In Maynard v. Sena, the Connecticut Appellate Court considered an appeal 
 
 186. Id. at 765-68. 
 187. Id. at 767 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 195) (quoting Daniel D. Blinka, Evidence 
of Character, Habit, and “Similar Acts” in Wisconsin Civil Litigation, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 283, 312 
(1989)). 
 188. Id. at 768. 
 189. Id. at 770. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 155. The mitral valve “[guards] the inlet to the left ventricle” and 
“prevents backflow to the left atrium during ventricular systole.” S. Y. Ho, Anatomy of the Mitral 
Valve, 88 Heart iv5, iv5 (2002). 
 192. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 155; see George Ntaios & Robert G. Hart, Embolic Stroke, 136 
CIRCULATION 2403 (2017). 
 193. Aikman, 975 A.2d at 155. 
 194. Id. at 157. 
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from a jury verdict in favor of a defendant-plastic surgeon.198 The basis of the 
claim was the allegation that the defendant-plastic surgeon performed an in-
office procedure “without wearing surgical gloves.”199 The trial court permitted 
the surgeon “to testify as to his habit of wearing gloves when performing surgical 
procedures in his office.”200 The defendant-surgeon had a thirty year career 
“and . . . he employed the same ‘sterile technique’ when performing every one of 
those procedures, regardless of the nature of the procedure.”201 He further 
testified “that he could not conceive of having performed the procedure on the 
plaintiff without gloves, because doing so would put him [sic] at risk for 
contracting an infection.”202 
The Connecticut Appellate Court referred to the Connecticut Code of 
Evidence governing habit evidence and its commentary.203 The commentary 
noted that “[h]abit . . . refer[s] to a course of conduct that is fixed, invariable, and 
unthinking, and generally pertain[s] to a very specific set of repetitive 
circumstances[.]”204 
Unlike other surgical procedures which, due to patient differences, are not 
likely fixed, invariable, and unthinking, the Connecticut Appellate Court must 
have viewed a surgeon’s use of surgical gloves as classic, habitual conduct as 
contemplated by the Connecticut Code of Evidence.205 A surgeon’s practice of 
wearing surgical gloves addresses surgical preparation and routine more so than 
the actual surgical procedure. The Connecticut Appellate Court was correct in 
approving the trial court’s decision to permit the surgeon’s testimony. 
2. Non-Surgical Medical Treatment and Habit 
Non-surgeon physicians are also able to avail themselves of habit testimony 
in medical negligence litigation. In Thomas v. Hardwick, the Nevada Supreme 
Court considered an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of an emergency 
medicine physician and a medical center.206 The key issue on appeal was the 
advice given to the patient by the emergency medicine physician; “[d]id [the 
decedent] leave the hospital . . . against medical advice, as [the defendants] 
maintain[,] or was [the decedent] told he was ‘fit as a fiddle’ and could safely 
 
 198. Maynard v. Sena, 158 Conn. App. 509, 511 (2015). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 514-15. 
 201. Id. at 515. 
 202. Id. at 517. 
 203. Id. at 518.; CONN. CODE EVID. Art. 4-6. 
 204. Maynard, 158 Conn. App. at 518 (citing to CONN. CODE EVID. Art. 4-6, commentary). 
 205. See id. 
 206. Thomas v. Hardwick, 231 P.3d 1111, 1112 (Nev. 2010). 
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leave, as appellant . . . maintains?”207 This issue, of course, relates to whether the 
defendant-physician complied with or deviated from the applicable standard of 
care: “that care which a reasonably well qualified physician would provide to a 
patient under the same or similar circumstances.”208 The Nevada Supreme Court 
commented on evidence of the applicable standard of care, noting that it 
“required [the defendant] to counsel [the patient] to agree to be admitted to the 
hospital for observation and testing, especially since [the patient’s] history 
disclosed he had no regular primary care physician.”209 The patient “left the 
emergency room . . . against medical advice” and was not admitted to the 
hospital.210 
At trial, the defendant-physician was permitted to testify to his “customary 
practice in treating chest pain patients[,]” and, therefore, “that he urged [the 
patient] to be admitted for observation and testing but he refused.”211 On appeal, 
the Nevada Supreme Court referred to the applicable Nevada evidentiary rule 
governing habit and routine practice evidence and held that the defendant’s trial 
testimony regarding his habit of counseling patients, such as the patient about 
which the medical negligence claim was filed, was, indeed, relevant.212 
Thomas v. Hardwick, although not an informed-consent-based medical 
negligence case, is arguably similar insofar as it involves a physician’s 
instruction or recommendation to a patient.213 The defendant-physician’s 
workload made it virtually impossible for him to recall the patient.214 Giving 
instructions to and counseling a patient “with chest pain complaints and 
inconclusive test results[,]” to be admitted to the hospital is fairly considered to 
be automatic or semi-automatic physician conduct.215 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in Rosebrock v. Eastern Shore 
Emergency Physicians, held that a defendant-emergency medicine physician 
could testify regarding her habit of examining and treating patients immobilized 
on backboards.216 Here, a nurse’s aide slipped and fell at a nursing home, was 
 
 207. Id. at 1113. 
 208. Marc D. Ginsberg, Beyond Canterbury: Can Medicine and Law Agree About Informed 
Consent? And Does it Matter?, 45 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 106, 106 (2017). 
 209. Thomas, 231 P.3d at 1113. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1117. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Id. at 1116. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Rosebrock v. Eastern Shore Emergency Physicians, 108 A.3d 424, 435 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2015); See Derek R. Cooney, Harry Wallus, Michael Asaly & Susan Wojcik, Backboard Time 
For Patients Receiving Spinal Immobilization By Emergency Medical Services, 6 INT’L J. 
EMERGENCY MED. 17 (2013) (explaining the use of long spine boards and the need to minimize 
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immobilized on a backboard by emergency medical technicians, and was taken to 
a hospital emergency room.217 Absent from the emergency room record was the 
defendant’s documentation of a back examination and any mention of the 
patient’s back pain.218 The patient was ultimately discharged from the hospital 
with a diagnosis of “knee and hip contusions.”219 
The patient’s condition worsened and the patient ultimately received an 
orthopedic consultation and x-rays, revealing “an acute compression fracture of 
the L3 vertebrae, ‘with possible retropulsed fragment[s] causing nerve root 
compression.’”220 The patient underwent a spinal fusion procedure, went to a 
rehabilitation center, sustained an unexpected “ventricular fibrillation arrest” 
causing “anoxic brain injury” and lapsed “into a persistent vegetative 
state . . . until her death.”221 The medical negligence lawsuit followed, 
culminating in a verdict in favor of the emergency medicine physician.222 
On appeal, the issue regarding the physician’s trial testimony essentially 
relates to the problem addressed earlier in this paper; is physician treatment 
“nonvolitional activity that [is] performed with invariable regularity?”223 If not, 
should a physician be precluded from testifying to habit when the relevant 
medical records do not describe the physician’s treatment?224 Significantly, the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals cited, with approval, the opinion of the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Aikman v. Kanda.225 There, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals held that the volitional nature of the physician’s treatment was 
relevant to the weight to be given to the habit testimony, not to its 
admissibility.226 With the volitional/non-volitional issue removed from the habit 
evidence equation in Rosebrock, the key barrier to admissibility fell. 
Finally, in Dawkins v. Siwicki, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
considered an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the defendant-emergency 
medicine physician in connection with a claim that he negligently diagnosed and 
treated a wrist injury.227 Allegedly, the defendant-physician diagnosed a wrist 
sprain for which the patient was splinted and bandaged.228 This diagnosis 
surprised the patient, as she believed her wrist was broken.229 
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At trial, the defendant-physician provided habit or routine practice testimony 
by stating that “when treating patients with similar symptoms and also, with 
patients who disagreed with a diagnosis, he would have advised plaintiff of the 
possibility that there was a fracture that was not apparent on the X-ray and that 
she should follow-up with her own doctor.”230 The medical record contained his 
note that a follow up visit with the patient’s primary care physician was 
advised.231 
On appeal, the habit evidence issue focused on the regularity of the 
physician’s conduct.232 Essentially, plaintiff’s position was that in the absence of 
the physician’s testimony specifying how frequently he treated patients with 
similar injuries, the physician did not establish the foundational basis for habit 
evidence.233 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island disposed of this issue without 
difficulty, stating that “[t]here is no bright-line rule about the number of times the 
witness must have engaged in a particular practice before evidence of habit and 
routine may be admitted.”234 The defendant-physician’s testimony regarding the 
many patients he has treated over many years, suffering from “certain types of 
symptoms or injuries” was sufficient to establish a “specific routine” and the 
foundation for his habit testimony.235 
3. Advising Patients of Mammography Failure Rate and Habit 
In Hoffart v. Hodge, the Nebraska Court of Appeals considered an appeal 
from a jury verdict in favor of a defendant-obstetrician-gynecologist, who 
allegedly failed to diagnose breast cancer.236 The patient had a palpable breast 
mass and a mammogram, which was interpreted as “‘[n]egative bilateral’ and the 
‘[p]alpable mass must still be evaluated on a clinical basis.’”237 The defendant-
physician testified “that he would have told her to make an appointment in 2 
months to be checked again.”238 The patient’s deposition testimony told a 
different, less concerning story.239 She “continued to check her breast” but did 
not return to see the defendant for quite a few months. 240 At that time, she was 
referred by the defendant-physician “to a surgeon for a biopsy, who removed a 
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1.5 centimeter mass which was found to be malignant.”241 Thereafter, the patient 
had extensive surgery, therapy and treatment, and succumbed to her disease.242 
The Nebraska Court of Appeals addressed the propriety of the defendant-
physician’s trial testimony regarding “his habit or routine of advising his patients 
about mammogram failure rates.”243 Significantly, as to the repetitive component 
of habit evidence, the Nebraska Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he precise 
contours of how frequently and consistently a behavior must occur to rise to the 
level of habit cannot be easily defined or formulated.”244 The Nebraska Court of 
Appeals recognized that habit evidence “may be the only vehicle available for a 
doctor to prove that he or she acted in a particular way on a particular occasion” 
insofar as it is simply not possible for a doctor to recall every patient 
encounter.245 The absence of detailed testimony “concerning regularity (which 
involves frequency and consistency), specificity, and involuntary response, 
which are the hallmarks of proof of habit by specific instances rather than by 
opinion, does not render the opinion evidence inadmissible.”246 The testimonial 
deficiencies relate to weight, not admissibility of the evidence.247 
The opinion in Hoffart suggests two important points: (1) physician habit 
may be necessary for a physician’s defense and (2) the testimonial foundation 
necessary to the admission of habit evidence is not rigid or formulaic.248 The trial 
court is required to evaluate the factual circumstances and exercise sound 
discretion in admitting this evidence.249 
4. Physician Communication with Other Physicians and Habit 
Very recently, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in Dazley v. Mercy St. Vincent 
Medical Center, approved of a defendant-physician’s habit testimony regarding 
communicating with consulting physicians, despite reversing summary judgment 
entered in favor of him.250 In Dazley, a seriously ill patient was seen in a hospital 
emergency department by an attending physician and then defendant, a resident 
physician.251 Following a cardiac work-up, the defendant-resident was directed 
“to contact . . . the cardiologist on call” and was instructed by the attending 
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physician to advise the cardiologist of specific information.252 The resident-
physician did “not remember the substance of [the] conversation” with the 
cardiology consultant, did not note the conversation in the chart, “and [the 
cardiology consultant] [did] not recall even having a conversation.”253 
The trial court approved the defendant-resident’s deposition testimony “as to 
what his habit would have been in communicating with a specialist” pursuant to 
the Ohio Rules of Evidence.254 The Ohio Court of Appeals addressed the 
elements of habit evidence, stating, “[t]o be admissible as evidence of habit, the 
occurrence of the stimulus and the responsive behavior must occur frequently 
enough to constitute a pattern. [citation omitted]. A sufficient foundation must be 
provided for the admission of habit evidence. [citation omitted].”255 The 
foundation was established by testimony of the frequency of conversations with 
consultants and of the contents of the conversations.256 Significantly, the Ohio 
Court of Appeals did not discuss the volitional vs. non-volitional nature of this 
conduct.257 
In Burris v. Lerner, the Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a summary 
judgment in favor of a physician and considered the propriety of that physician’s 
deposition testimony relating to his habit of contacting a referring physician 
about test results.258 Here, a defendant-resident scheduled a patient for a cardiac 
work-up via a thallium stress test.259 The test result was read and interpreted by 
the co-defendant-cardiologist.260 The result was abnormal, “suggestive of either 
cardiomyopathy or potentially ischemia in the absence of inducible symptoms of 
ischemia or diagnostic EKG changes.”261 
The co-defendant-cardiologist testified, by deposition, “that, in light of the 
abnormalities in [the] test results, it would have been his custom and practice to 
have called the referring physician . . . at the time he was reviewing the scans.”262 
He would have “call[ed] the referring physician the very evening that he was 
interpreting the test results ‘[i]f there was a test that’s abnormal or . . . of 
moderate probability for a problem and requires further evaluation.’”263 
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Furthermore, if the co-defendant-cardiologist was unable to contact the referring 
physician “that evening, he would have left a message with her answering service 
asking her to call him.”264 The co-defendant-cardiologist referring physician had 
no recollection of receiving a call from the cardiologist.265 Her position was that 
she was never “advised of the abnormality discovered on the thallium scans.”266 
Regrettably, the patient “died of a myocardial infarction.”267 
The aforementioned testimony led the Ohio Court of Appeals to pose this 
question, and resolution: “whether [the co-defendant-cardiologist’s] testimony as 
to his custom and practice may suffice to controvert [the referring physician’s] 
testimony that she received no such call. Under the law of Ohio, we find that it 
may.”268 The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed Ohio jurisprudence relating to 
habit or routine practice evidence in medical-hospital negligence litigation and 
concluded that the co-defendant-cardiologist’s customary practice testimony was 
“admissible to contradict [the referring physician’s] testimony that she never 
received such a call.”269 Summary judgment in favor of the defendant-referring 
physician was reversed due to this significant evidentiary conflict.270 
VI. THE NEED FOR PHYSICIAN HABIT TESTIMONY IN NON-INFORMED CONSENT 
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION 
The Nebraska Court of Appeals, in Hoffart v. Hodge, correctly identified the 
need for physician habit as follows: 
[W]e must recognize the reality that a doctor cannot be expected 
to specifically recall the advice or explanation he or she gives to 
each and every patient he or she sees and treats . . . [E]vidence of 
habit may be the only vehicle available for a doctor to prove that 
he or she acted in a particular way on a particular occasion, and, 
therefore, proof of habit may be highly relevant.271 
It seems apparent that physicians cannot and do not record every detail of 
patient encounters and procedures. I have never subscribed to the theory that “if 
it wasn’t documented, it didn’t happen” and, frankly, based on my experience 
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representing physicians, I do not believe that juries subscribe to this theory.272 
The nature of the practice of medicine makes physician habit evidence necessary 
and its admissibility will not compromise the fairness of a jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Physician habit evidence has been embraced by courts (albeit not 
unanimously) in non-informed consent medical negligence litigation. The 
admissibility of this evidence is not without controversy, particularly with respect 
to its source and its reliance on volitional conduct. Rule 406 and analogous state 
evidentiary rules neither specify the source of habit evidence testimony nor the 
automatic, semi-automatic, or non-volitional nature of habitual conduct which 
has historically occupied a role in the analysis of habit evidence.273 Of course, the 
most likely source of habit evidence in medical negligence litigation is the 
defendant-physician. An enlightened view of the non-volitional, semi-automatic 
or automatic nature of habitual conduct suggests that volitional, non-reflexive, 
judgment based physician conduct can still form the basis of habitual conduct 
and habit evidence, and these factors would relate to evidentiary weight, not 
admissibility. 
Physician habit evidence in non-informed consent medical negligence 
litigation should be welcomed by courts as the courts have welcomed habit 
evidence in informed consent cases.274 This evidence assists physicians in 
providing a fair and reasonable defense in medical negligence litigation. 
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